In this article, we investigate the relationship between loneliness and misogyny amongst the online movement of “involuntary celibates” (incels) that has become widely known through several violent attacks. While loneliness plays a prominent role in the incels’ self-descriptions, we lack a comprehensive analysis of their experience of loneliness and its role in their radicalization. Our article offers such an analysis. We analyze how loneliness is felt, described, and implicitly understood by incels, investigate the normative presumptions underlying their experiences, and critically (...) reflect on the political function of their discourse of loneliness. We claim that it is the affective mechanism of ressentiment that transforms loneliness into antagonistic emotions and show how loneliness is exacerbated rather than alleviated through the incel community. Finally, we point to the relevance of our analysis for contemporary philosophical and feminist loneliness studies. (shrink)

Lectio Praecursoria 5.10.2018: Artikkeli on väitöstilaisuudessa esitetyn englanninkielisen lectio praecursorian käännös. Väitöskirja tutkii ranskalaisfilosofi Michel Foucault’n kokemuksen käsitteitä sekä teemoja, joita hän käsittelee näiden käsitteiden avulla. Analysoimalla eri kokemuksen käsitteitä Foucault'n filosofiassa voimme paitsi ymmärtää paremmin hänen länsimaiseen nykyajatteluun olennaisesti vaikuttanutta työtään myös peilata käsityksiämme terveydestä, mielenterveysongelmista ja itseen kohdistuvista käytännöistä. Usein häneen viitataan ajattelijana, joka kyseenalaistaa kokemusnäkökulman lähtökohtana tieteelliselle tiedolle. Kokemuksen käsitteillä on kuitenkin erityisasema Foucault’n varhaisissa, psykiatriaa ja psykologiaa käsittelevissä kirjoituksissa sekä hänen myöhäisissä etiikkaa tutkivissa teksteissään, joissa hän (...) palaa käsittelemään terveyden ja huolenpidon teemoja. Teksteistä löytyy runsaasti viitteitä ”elettyyn kokemukseen”, ”taustakokemukseen”, ”transformatiiviseen kokemukseen”, ”rajakokemukseen”, ”kokemuksen kenttään” ja ”kokemuksen muotoihin”. Väitöskirja siis asettaa kokemuksen Foucault’n filosofian keskiöön ja analysoi kokemuksen käsitteiden teoreettisia tehtäviä ja merkityksiä. Tutkimus käsittelee myös sitä, minkälaiseksi kokemuksen itsestä on ajateltu muodostuvan filosofisissa traditioissa, joissa kehotetaan kuuntelemaan ja tarkastelemaan itseä, kääntymään itseen, uskomaan itseensä sekä löytämään itsensä. Lopulta tutkimus nivoo kokemusteeman yhteen Foucault’n kriittisen filosofian kanssa. (shrink)

Yksinäisyyttä pidetään yleisesti vakavana yhteiskunnallisena ongelmana. Yksinäisyys kuitenkin ymmärretään monin eri tavoin, mikä herättää filosofisia kysymyksiä siitä, minkälaisena ilmiönä sitä tulisi tutkia. Artikkelissa käsittelen erilaisia yksinäisyyden muotoja erityisesti koetun yksinäisyyden näkökulmasta. Tutkin yksinäisyyttä sellaisten tunteiden filosofian nykysuuntausten avulla, jotka painottavat tunteiden ja ilmapiirien vuorovaikutuksellista muodostumista. Väitän, etteivät koetun yksinäisyyden näkökulma ja tunteiden filosofinen lähestymistapa tarkoita ilmiön yhteiskunnallisten tekijöiden sivuuttamista. Koska yksinäisyyttä ei voi erottaa yhteiskunnallisesta tilanteestaan ja tavoista, joilla ihmissuhteet kulttuurisesti järjestyvät, käsittelen artikkelissa koettua yksinäisyyttä myös poliittisen filosofian konteksteissa.

Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) thought is widely used in the humanities and social sciences for investigating experiences of madness, illness, marginalization and social conflicts. However, the meaning of the word “experience” is not always clearly defined, and the French word expérience has a whole variety of meanings. In this article I explicate Foucault’s most relevant concepts of experience and their theoretical functions. He refers to experience throughout his career, especially in his early texts on existential psychiatry from the 1950s and 1960s (...) and in his late work from the 1980s. Texts such as Mental Illness and Psychology and Dire vrai sur soi-même have received less attention than Foucault’s most famous books, but they show that references to experience form significant theoretical and thematic links between his earlier investigations of mental distress and his late work on ethics. When Foucault reorganizes his work in the 1980s, he looks back to his early work in his search for a new concept of experience. I argue that in these contexts, experience cannot be understood as an outcome of activity that organizes perceptions and leads to objective knowledge, but experiences are not defined as events produced by discourses, either. I demonstrate in this article how Foucault uses the concept of experience to structure his research on ethical subjectivity and cultural practices of care. At the same time the article questions some standard interpretations of his work. (shrink)

In this article, we investigate how distressing background feelings can be subject to social injustice. We define background feelings as enduring feeling states that condition our perceptions of everyday situations, interpersonal dynamics, and the broader social milieu. While phenomenological psychopathology has long addressed such affective phenomena, including anxiety, guilt, and feelings of not belonging, the intersection with social injustice remains largely unexplored within the framework. To address this gap, we introduce the concept of existential injustice into phenomenological psychopathology. Existential injustice (...) pertains to the unjust formation, perpetuation, and treatment of background feelings. We contend that distressing alterations in these feeling states can stem from, or be perpetuated by, unjust social structures and practices. Existential injustice manifests as a felt inadequacy of one’s background feelings, reflecting broader societal disparities and inequities. Drawing on themes from social psychiatry, we illustrate the utility and explanatory power of the concept through two concrete examples. By shedding light on the ways in which societal dynamics shape distressing affective experiences our analysis underscores the importance of integrating aspects of social injustice into the study of affective phenomena in phenomenological psychopathology. (shrink)

Johanna Oksala, Feminist Experiences. Foucauldian and Phenomenological Investigations, Northwestern University Press. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Evanston Illinois, 2016, 189 sivua.

I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of (...) the individual members of the group. (shrink)

Enligt ett realistiskt synsätt kan ett påstående vara sant trots att det inte ens i princip är möjligt att veta att det är sant. En sanningsteoretisk antirealist kan inte godta denna möjlighet utan accepterar en eller annan version av Dummetts vetbarhetsprincip: (K) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det i princip vara möjligt att veta att det är sant. Det kan dock förefalla rimligt, även för en antirealist, att gå̊ med på̊ att det kan finnas sanningar som ingen faktiskt (...) vet (har vetat, eller kommer att veta) är sanna. Man kan därför tänka sig att en antirealist skulle acceptera principen (K) utan att därför gå med på den till synes starkare principen: (SK) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det faktiskt finnas någon som vet att det är sant. Ett mycket omdiskuterat argument – som ytterst går tillbaka till Alonzo Church, men som först publicerades i en uppsats av Frederic Fitch i Journal of Symbolic Logic 1963 – tycks emellertid visa att principen (K) implicerar principen (SK). Anta nämligen att (K) är sann, medan (SK) inte är det. Men om (SK) är falsk, så finns det ett påstående som är sant men som ingen faktiskt vet är sant. Anta nu att p är ett sådant påstående. Låt Kp betyda att någon vet att p är sant. Det galler alltså̊ att p är sant samtidigt som Kp inte är det. Betrakta nu påståendet (p ∧ −Kp). Enligt antagandet är detta påstående sant. Enligt (K) måste det då vara möjligt att någon vet att (p ∧ −Kp). D.v.s., det måste vara möjligt att påståendet K(p ∧ −Kp) är sant. Men i så fall är det också̊ möjligt att påståendet Kp ∧ K−Kp är sant, vilket i sin tur implicerar att det är möjligt att Kp ∧ −Kp är sant, vilket ju är absurt. Således kan inte (K) vara sann samtidigt som (SK) är falsk. Vi tycks således kunna sluta oss till att (K) implicerar (SK). I uppsatsen diskuterar jag några olika sätt att undgå̊ Church-Fitch paradoxala slutsats. Ett tillvägagångssätt är att ersätta kunskapsoperatorn med en hierarki av kunskapspredikat. Ett annat är baserat på distinktionen mellan faktisk och potentiell kunskap och ett förkastande av den vanliga modallogiska formaliseringen av principen (K). Den senare typen av lösning betraktas både från ett realistiskt och ett icke-realistiskt perspektiv. Utifrån denna analys kommer jag fram till slutsatsen att vi, vare sig vi är realister eller antirealister rörande sanning, kan sluta oroa oss för vetbarhetsparadoxen och ändå uppskatta Church-Fitchs argument. (shrink)

David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing (...) the very goals that Hull believes need to be explained by reference to an invisible hand mechanism. Thus, I reduce the scope of Hull's invisible hand explanation and supplement it by appealing to a hidden hand explanation. (shrink)

Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be (...) called "knowledge." In this paper, I (a) explain Longino's epistemology, and (b) defend it against charges that have recently been raised by Kitcher, Schmitt, and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the same (adverse) affect on inquiry. She also recommends that we distinguish knowledge from mere opinion by reference to a social standard. (shrink)

TheCulexis now widely recognized as a piece of post-Ovidian, possibly Tiberian, pseudo-juvenilia written by an author impersonating the young Virgil, although it was attached to Virgil's name already in the first centuryc.e., being identified as Virgilian by Statius, Suetonius and Martial. Dedicated to the young Octavian (Octauiin line 1), the poem seems to fill a biographical gap in Virgil's career before his composition of theEclogues. It is introduced as aludus, which Irene Peirano suggests may openly refer to ‘the act of (...) impersonating Virgil’, and, like many of the poems in theAppendix Vergiliana, it seems to have a parodic intent. TheCulexhas been interpreted as a parody of neoteric style and the epyllion, as mock-epic, as Virgil parody (John Henderson called it a ‘spoofAeneidin bucolic drag’), as pointed Augustan satire, as mock Ovidian ‘Weltgedicht’ and as just very bad poetry (Housman's ‘stutterer’). Glenn Most has observed that the poem's three ‘acts’ structurally recapitulate Virgil's three major works in chronological succession. Little attention, however, has been paid to theCulex's final lines, which contain a catalogue of flowers thepastorplaces on the gnat's tomb. Recent scholarship has reintroduced an older interpretation of the gnat's tomb as a political allegory of Augustus’ Mausoleum; in this paper I suggest instead that the tomb and its flowers serve a closural and metapoetic function at the end of the poem. (shrink)

A series of letters between a professor of philosophy and an eleven-year-old girl.

This study analyzed 16 potential ethics-related problems associated with use and abuse of video news releases (VNRs) by public relations practitioners and electronic journalists. Causes and possible solutions to the problems were suggested and model ethics code guidelines were developed. Moral rules, moral ideals, theories of ethics, public relations theories, and electronic journalism theories were used to provide a general foundation for the analysis. A more specific foundation was provided by guidelines from a variety of media codes of ethics.

I wish to discuss symbols concerned with the way we feel about the world and the way we conduct our lives in consequence of those feelings. Our conduct is guided by commands and instructions which for some reason we have to obey. We are guided by our knowledge of the world. The symbols I wish to discuss express and excite desires and preferences and that is how they affect our conduct.

The effects of the vacuum electromagnetic fluctuations and the radiation reaction fields on the time development of a simple microscopic system are identified using a new mathematical method. This is done by studying a charged mechanical oscillator (frequency Ω 0)within the realm of stochastic electrodynamics, where the vacuum plays the role of an energy reservoir. According to our approach, which may be regarded as a simple mathematical exercise, we show how the oscillator Liouville equation is transformed into a Schrödinger-like stochastic (...) equation with a free parameter h′ with dimensions of action. The role of the physical Planck's constant h is introduced only through the zero-point vacuum electromagnetic fields. The perturbative and the exact solutions of the stochastic Schrödinger-like equation are presented for h′>0. The exact solutions for which h′<h are called sub-Heisenberg states. These nonperturbative solutions appear in the form of Gaussian, non-Heisenberg states for which the initial classical uncertainty relation takes the form 〈(δx 2)〉〈(δp) 2 〉=(h′/2) 2,which includes the limit of zero indeterminacy (h → 0). We show how the radiation reaction and the vacuum fields govern the evolution of these non-Heisenberg states in phase space, guaranteeing their decay to the stationary state with average energy hΩ 0 /2 and 〈(δx) 2 〉〈(δp) 2 〉=h 2 /4 at zero temperature. Environmental and thermal effects-are briefly discussed and the connection with similar works within the realm of quantum electrodynamics is also presented. We suggest some other applications of the classical non-Heisenberg states introduced in this paper and we also indicate experiments which might give concrete evidence of these states. (shrink)

Grush's emulation theory comprises both modality-specific and amodal emulators. I suggest that the amodal variety be replaced by multisensory emulators. The key distinction is that multisensory processing retains the characteristics of individual sensory modalities, in contrast to amodal processing. The latter term is better reserved for conceptual and linguistic systems, rather than perception or emulation.

Open peer commentary on the article “Radical Constructivism and Radical Constructedness: Luhmann’s Sociology of Semantics, Organizations, and Self-Organization” by Loet Leydesdorff. > Upshot: Leydesdorff emphasises the uncertainties involved in the communication of meaning. Luhmann posited three types of media, each of which reduces one type of communicative improbability. The theory of cultural evolution supports Leydesdorff’s emphasis on the uncertainty of communication, and agrees that different media are needed for communication within and across social boundaries. But it highlights the distinction between (...) media and the symbolic codes that give them structure; and it raises the question whether Luhmann’s symbolically generalized communication media are really media at all. (shrink)